Introduction
In today’s international armed conflicts (IACs), the lines between civilian protection and military necessity are blurred by the emergence of ‘voluntary’ human shields. While international law unequivocally prohibits the use of human shields, it lacks specific definition in codified treaties and conventions. Human shields can be categorized in three ways: voluntary, involuntary and passive/proximate.1 Voluntary human shields are defined as “a civilian who willingly decides to protect a military target using his or her body to achieve deterrence”. 2 In contrast, an involuntary human shield is a civilian who has been forced or coerced to be used. 3 However, the true ‘voluntariness’ of human shields has been notably controversial, as in today’s modern warfare, this categorization seems to have broadened. A civilian categorized as a voluntary human shield is often considered as taking direct participation in hostilities. However others object to this classification, saying that there must be “a physical chain of causality, harm to the enemy or its military operations” in order for a true voluntary human shield to be identified. 4 Thus, the matter of a ‘voluntary’ human shield is incredibly ambiguous and varies on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, states such as Israel have been reported to apply this label to extensive populations which block military targets. This piece argues that the concept of voluntariness in human shields undermines the core protections of international humanitarian law and is prone to misuse. By looking at the law as well as real-world cases, this piece seeks to uncover whether human shields can ever be truly voluntary and what implications their use holds for the international community.

How does International Law Address Voluntary Human Shields?
The concept of human shields was first created by Gandhi as a method of resistance. 5 However the idea of a voluntary human shield was first brought to the center stage in 2003 by an American peace activist who lost her life standing in front of an Israeli army vehicle to prevent the demolition of homes in Palestine. 6
In international law, specifically international humanitarian law (IHL), the use of human shields is expressly prohibited. Although there exist different types of human shields, Article 28 of the Geneva Convention IV offers a general prohibition to human shields, as it prohibits the use of protected persons in order to “render certain points or areas immune from military operations”. 7 Moreover, Art. 57(1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states that:
“The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations”. 8
The use of a human shield in IACs also classifies as a war crime under Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiiii) of the Rome Statute.9 Furthermore, customary IHL, specifically Rule 97 of the ICRC Customary Rules, also prohibits the use of human shields. 10 The principle of distinction is also relevant to human shields, as civilians are typically afforded legal protection in armed conflict. This fundamental principle of IHL ensures that militaries must distinguish between civilians and civilian objects and legitimate military targets in their conduct. A violation of this principle is considered a war crime under Art. 2(b)(i) and (ii) of the Rome Statute. 11 The illegal nature of human shields has been identified in several cases, such as in the ICTY Nateilic and Martinovic ICTY case, 12 and the Blaškić case. 13 Nonetheless, even though human shields are prohibited in IHL, they are still utilized in modern warfare.
The Consequences of this Classification
Human shields have been used in many past conflicts, including Israel and Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and in the Persian Gulf War as reported by the United States and United Kingdom. 14In practice, it is difficult to differentiate between a voluntary and an involuntary shield. “How can a pilot or soldier launching a missile know whether the civilians he observes around a military objective are there voluntarily or involuntarily?”. 15 Moreover, what counts as a ‘voluntary’ human shield is highly subjective and open to interpretation by each state’s military, as it lacks international legal codification. States have made different claims of what is considered ‘voluntary’. For example, the Israeli military has claimed that after dropping leaflets on the Northern population in Gaza, illustrating the need to leave the area, those who are left behind are considered ‘terrorists’.16 This is problematic, as casting such a wide classification also encompasses individuals who are not able to leave the area due to physical ailments or the constant attacks around their neighborhoods. Moreover, trying to create intent for these civilians by calling them ‘terrorists’ puts their lives in danger. It should be noted that this has also been named ‘proximate’ shielding by some new sources, however this example brings to light how describing civilians’ intent to be ‘terrorists’ also fits into the definition of voluntary shielding, as seen in Israel’s messages detailing how those who are prevented from leaving by Hamas are involuntary shields, while those who “willfully stayed behind …would therefore be considered “an accomplice in a terrorist organisation”, according to mobile phone audio messages and air-dropped leaflets”. 17 This justification further complicates the treatment of civilians, as it potentially shifts the legal and ethical parameters of what constitutes a legitimate military target under international law. Therefore, those who are considered voluntary human shields are thus not the few who will sacrifice themselves for a greater cause, but instead, those who are assigned the role by States who utilize this emerging legal justification for their violation of the principle of distinction. As a result of the lack of a legal definition for a ‘voluntary’ human shield, it is therefore twisted by militaries to fit their military goals. Legal scholars have stated that in today’s IACs, the “human body has been utilized as a novel and lethal weapon”. 18 Those who identified as a ‘voluntary’ human shield are subject to the difficulty “in tracking intentions”, resulting in “any presumption on the part of the targeting agent to know ex-ante whether a civilian is volunteering to be a shield cannot be adequately substantiated”. 19 This calls into question the legal basis upon which the argument for human shields is built upon, as ”even if the use of human shields by a party to the conflict is a clear violation of IHL, military commanders remain bound to obey IHL rules protecting civilians if they still decide to proceed with the attack”. 20 In fact, it has been stated by Medecins San Frontieres that “the presence of human shields in or around a legitimate military objective does not relieve military commanders of their duty of distinction…”. 21 This sentiment has been echoed by the ICRC, who have stated that civilians who classify as voluntary human shields “do not sacrifice their full protection as civilians through their actions”. 22 Therefore, the differentiation between protected involuntary shields and unprotected voluntary shields can be considered redundant, as civilians in both categories should be afforded their protected status by IHL. Labeling broad groups as ‘voluntary’ can erode these civilian protections and set dangerous precedents. Nevertheless, today’s identification of voluntary human shields in Gaza by Israel exemplifies the ongoing issue of the subjectivity of this classification, as well as the ethical and legal ramifications.
Conclusion
Identifying a civilian as a weapon of war is a severe and often fatal categorization, and the legal justification of which is often questioned by legal scholars.23 Casting wide areas of Gaza as human shields bends the law which aims at protecting civilians, and brings into question whether this will be tolerated by the international legal community. The principle of distinction is an essential principle of IHL, and is abandoned when militaries subjectively decide which human shields are ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’ and thereby determining which civilians are protected or unprotected. This subjectivity poses a grave threat to civilian lives and challenges the fundamental principles of IHL. This potential for misuse risks normalizing these violations. As these types of human shields remain officially undefined, their existence in modern warfare threatens the delicate balance of IHL fundamental principles and international norms.

1 Al Jazeera, 'What Is a Human Shield and Why Is Israel Using the Term in Gaza?' (13 November 2023) accessed 31 October 2024.
2 Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini, 'Human Shields, Sovereign Power, and the Evisceration of the Civilian' (2016) 110 AJIL Unbound 329 https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2016.7 accessed 2 January 2025, p 332.
3 'Human Shields' (Guide to International Humanitarian Law, no date) https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/human-shields/ accessed 22 October 2024.
4 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 'ICRC Casebook on International Humanitarian Law' https://casebook.icrc.org/ accessed 2 January 2025.
5 Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini, Human Shields: A History of People in the Line of Fire (University of California Press 2020)
6 Kristina Maalouf, 'The Political Question Doctrine in the Ninth Circuit and Why It Should Not Have Barred the Adjudication of Corrie v Caterpillar' (2014) 44 Golden Gate UL Rev 35, 36.
7 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287, Art 28.
8 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3, Art. 57(1)
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii).
10 ICRC, 'Rule 97. Human Shields' (ICRC Customary IHL Database) https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/Rule97 accessed 16 November 2024.
11 (n 9) Art. 2(b)(i), (ii).
12 Naletilić and Martinović (Judgment) ICTY Case No IT-98-34 (31 March 2003) paras 268, 270, 271–272, 288–290, 302–303, 334.
13 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) ICTY Case No IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004) para 654.
14 ICRC, 'Israel/Lebanon/Hezbollah Conflict 2006' (ICRC Casebook) https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/israellebanonhezbollah-conflict-2006#part_ii_para_6 accessed 16 November 2024, Part II, paras 6–11; ICRC, 'Sri Lanka: Conflict in the Vanni' (ICRC Casebook) https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/sri-lanka-conflict-vanni#para_3 accessed 16 November 2024, paras 3–9; ICRC, 'United States/United Kingdom: Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War' (ICRC Casebook)https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/united-statesunited-kingdom-report-conduct-persian-gulf-war accessed 16 November 2024
15 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 'ICRC Casebook on International Humanitarian Law' https://casebook.icrc.org/ accessed 2 January 2025.
16 Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, 'Human Shields in Gaza: A Legal Justification for Genocide?' (Jewish Currents, 17 July 2024) https://jewishcurrents.org/human-shields-gaza-israel-a-legal-justification-for-genocide accessed 2 January 2025.
17 (n 1).
18 Banu Bargu, 'Human Shields' (2013) 12 Contemporary Political Theory 277, abstract.
19 (n 2).
20 'Human Shields' (Guide to International Humanitarian Law, no date) https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/human-shields/ accessed 22 October 2024
21 Ibid.
22 Michael N. Schmitt, 'What Is and Is Not Human Shielding?' (Lieber Institute West Point, 3 November 2023) https://lieber.westpoint.edu/what-is-and-is-not-human-shielding/ accessed 16 November 2024.; Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC 2009) https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf accessed 16 November 2024 p. 56-57
23 UN Human Rights Council, 'Anatomy of a Genocide: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, Francesca Albanese' (26 February–5 April 2024) UN Doc A/HRC/55/73.
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