Introduction
The Sahel region, the vast semi-arid region of Africa separating the Sahara Desert to the north and tropical savannas to the south, has long been associated with violence and instability, particularly in countries like Niger and Burkina Faso.[1] While being among the poorest, the region has the fastest population growth rate in Africa.[2]
Despite facing widespread economic challenges among its inhabitants, the region possesses considerable natural wealth in the form of minerals. This has attracted the attention of external powers seeking to exploit these resources.[3] Around 3.3 million individuals were forcibly relocated in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger by the end of 2023. Insufficient food supplies, rising conflict and violence, and political instability all contribute to the Sahel's ongoing displacement and worsening protection problems. Additionally, displacement has become worse by the consequences of climate change.[4] Above all, the Sahel region is threatened by terrorist organisations and violence.[5] The conflicts in this region have deep-rooted historical, ethnic, and socio-economic contexts. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are currently led by military regimes. In July 2024, these countries established an Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and withdrew from traditional security and regional partners such as the African Union and the United Nations, and The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Treaty.[6] The creation of the AES marks a significant geopolitical turning point in the Sahel. This article will discuss the legal implications of the AES's formation, the challenges it faces, and its potential impact on regional stability and cooperation.
Background of the Conflicts in the Sahel region: Mali, Burkina Faso & Niger
As stated above, the conflicts in the Sahel region have deep-rooted historical, ethnic, and socio-economic contexts. These can be found in the region at the same time, even within a single state. Historically, the Sahel has experienced a legacy of colonial exploitation and post-independence political fragility.[7] Especially Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger form a “crisis triangle”.[8] After gaining independence from France in the 1960s, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger struggled to establish stable governments.
Mali
Mali, officially known as the Republic of Mali, is a land-locked West African state, and it is the second-largest country in the Sahel.[9] It's one of the world's poorest countries, with diverse ethnic groups.[10] Since 2011, the central Sahel has seen mass migration due to unrest in Northern Mali, caused by poverty, unemployment, poor governance, and militant groups.[11] Since 2012 Mali has been at the heart of the conflicts in the Sahel region. This is because of an Islamist takeover of all the northern cities, an improvised military coup, and the fourth Tuareg rebellion in Mali's post-colonial history occurred between January and April 2012.[12] Despite international support, such as France forces, the government struggles to control the country. Two recent coups further destabilised Mali in 2021, creating a power vacuum exploited by extremists.[13]
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso is also a landlocked country, characterised by its vast savannas and reliance on agriculture and gold mining.[14] In 2014, protests against President Compaoré's 27-year rule erupted over constitutional changes to extend his term. These protests led to Compaoré's removal in October 2014, followed by an attempted military coup in September 2015, which further destabilised the country.[15] Burkina Faso has witnessed a steep incline in extremist violence since 2015, especially in the northern and eastern regions. This was partly due to a spillover from jihadist activities from neighbouring conflicts, especially after the collapse of security in northern Mali since 2012.[16] The country’s political instability worsened, marked by 2 coups in 2022, and has further weakened the government’s capacity to address the ongoing crisis. Terrorist groups have since found a foothold in Burkina Faso's outlying areas, tapping into existing social and political problems. These groups have exploited local conflicts, socio-economic issues, and governance grievances to establish footholds in remote regions.[17]
Niger
Niger, officially known as the Republic of Niger and also a landlocked country in West Africa, is bordering 7 nations, including Mali and Burkina Faso.[18] With a poverty rate of 44,1% Niger is one of the world’s poorest countries.[19] Furthermore, the country faces challenges such as youth unemployment, limited access to education, organised crime, and military activity. Since 2010, Niger has had a functioning multiparty system. However, regional instability has led to an increase of refugees from Mali and Nigeria into Niger, worsening food shortage.[20] Protests in Niger have mirrored those in neighbouring countries like Mali and Burkina Faso, where military governments have sought to distance themselves from French military presence.[21] Since 2011, Niger has also struggled with the spillover of extremist violence, mainly from Mali and Nigeria, where groups like Boko Haram have expanded terrorist activities. In 2021, an unsuccessful coup attempt highlighted Niger's political instability, influenced by Mali's military takeover. By 2023, Niger faced a military coup, removing its elected leaders. This reflects a growing West African trend of military interventions, often justified as countering extremism.[22]
Withdrawal from traditional security and regional partners
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) on the 16th of September 2023, with the signing of the Liptako-Gourma Charter, as a mutual defense pact primarily driven by shared discontent with ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and Western interventions.[23] The ECOWAS treaty was signed by the Heads of States and Governments and the revised Treaty has been active since 1993. In addition to agreeing to 93 distinct articles, the signature of the amended treaty obligated the sovereign states to cooperate as a single regional economic bloc.[24] The AES agreement seeks to enhance security cooperation in the region and establish a degree of autonomy from ECOWAS regulations. It also aims to create an economic and monetary union.[25] This was in response to ECOWAS imposing punitive measures on these nations after military takeovers occurred. On January 28, 2024, the AES countries formally announced their intention to withdraw from ECOWAS. This withdrawal is referred to as ‘Sahelexit’.[26] On May 17, 2024, foreign ministers from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger met in Niamey, Niger, to finalise a draft agreement establishing the AES.[27] The confederation was officially established on July 6, 2024.[28] Practically speaking, the three have stated several main justifications for the united action.
Firstly, The African Union (AU) and ECOWAS have shown a notable inability to offer sufficient assistance in the fight against jihadists.[29] It is indeed noticeable that the AU and ECOWAS face serious challenges when it comes to combating jihadist violence in the Sahel region. Main issues include a lack of coordinated military responses among member states and operational difficulties stemming from political disagreements and insufficient funding.[30] The rise of jihadist groups, such as ISIS affiliates and al-Qaeda-linked organizations, has outpaced the response capabilities of these organizations, leading to perceptions of ineffectiveness.[31] Additionally, reliance on external support from Western nations has created dependency, undermining local ownership of security initiatives and complicating efforts to address the region's needs.[32]
Secondly, The AES countries claim that "illegal sanctions" are being applied that are detrimental to the populace.[33] ECOWAS, Africa’s oldest economic community, was originally created to encourage economic collaboration in West Africa. Over time, it has also taken on the role of promoting democratic principles and good governance.[34] When member countries experience unconstitutional power changes, like the recent events in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, ECOWAS often responds with sanctions. These sanctions include travel bans and asset freezes against the new leaders, but also the more comprehensive suspension of financial and commercial exchanges, and border closures for Mali and Niger.[35] In addition to these sanctions, the ECOWAS has also suspended the AES countries from the decision-making processes meetings after their military coups. In an attempt to reduce the tensions, ECOWAS lifted the sanctions on 24 February 2024, but without result.[36] Although these measures are in line with the ECOWAS Treaty, and successive protocols that empower the community to maintain peace, stability, and democracy, these measures have not always been successful.[37] They have sometimes had unintended negative consequences for other ECOWAS members, making it harder for countries to work together economically. This has led to higher costs for trade between countries and has made it more difficult to achieve the goal of regional integration. Additionally, these sanctions have sometimes worsened humanitarian situations in the affected areas.[38]
Thirdly, the AES countries believe that the bloc of ECOWAS countries has fallen under the influence of and indiscriminately manipulated by foreign governments, particularly France.[39] The countries stated, “Moreover, ECOWAS, under the influence of foreign powers and betraying its founding principles, has become a threat to its member states and their populations whose happiness it is supposed to promote.”[40]
Lastly, ECOWAS has threatened to intervene in Niger to restore civilian rule. After the military coup of Niger in July 2023, the ECOWAS threatened to use force and reinstate the deposed President Bazoum. But the military juntas in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso threatened to intervene should ECOWAS invade Niger.[41]
Consequences for the AES region
The establishment of the AES and the union of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger can have multiple outcomes. These outcomes could impact both the AES members and other ECOWAS nations in various ways. For instance, it might affect how people and goods move between countries, change trade relationships, and influence regional policies in different sectors.[42] While these countries have the right to make this decision, it is important to note that according to the ECOWAS Treaty of 1993, the process of leaving takes a full year after they officially notify the organisation. During this time, they are still considered members of ECOWAS.[43] Unlike sanctions, which are temporary in nature, the withdrawal of the AES states is permanent. As mentioned before, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are landlocked countries. Therefore these countries are dependent on coastal ECOWAS members for their trade routes. This can have a major impact on their economies. This is because they might have to pay more taxes on goods and handle more paperwork when trading with the countries still in ECOWAS.[44] It is worth noting that the AES leaders have chosen to maintain their membership in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which is part of ECOWAS. This decision could help reduce potential economic disruptions in the AES region resulting from their ECOWAS exit.[45] However, the exit of these countries from ECOWAS poses a challenge for UEMOA's operations. With UEMOA now split between ECOWAS members and non-members, it might be harder to coordinate economic policies. This split could also make it tricky to manage the shared currency and the central bank. These challenges may significantly affect UEMOA's operational efficiency and effectiveness in the foreseeable future.
The withdrawal of AES countries from ECOWAS might also affect regional cooperation in security matters, defense strategies, and counter-terrorism efforts[46], although these areas have not always been effectively managed within ECOWAS either.[47] This is because the AES countries are then removed from shared security plans across the region.
Lastly, it is important to note that This split might make it harder for countries to work together on fighting terrorism and other threats in the region. It could also make it tougher for the remaining ECOWAS countries to handle security issues on their own, as they might not have enough funding or personnel.[48]
Conclusion
It is evident that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are the epicentre of chaos in the Sahel region. A military takeover has taken place in these countries in recent years.
The creation of the AES marks a major geopolitical turning point in the Sahel region.
With the long-term presence of dissatisfaction for namely the functioning and credibility of the ECOWAS and its imposed sanctions, the countries deemed it necessary to withdraw from these traditional security and regional partners. By withdrawing from traditional partners like ECOWAS, governed by its 1993 treaty, and the African Union, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are asserting their desire for autonomy in addressing security challenges. However, this move also raises concerns about the potential fragmentation of regional cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and managing humanitarian crises. The effectiveness of the AES will largely depend on its ability to unify these nations in a coordinated response to the multifaceted threats they face, while also navigating the complexities of external influences.
[1] Centro de estudos estratégicos de África. (2024, October 21). Region in focus: The Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Africa Center. https://africacenter.org/in-focus/the-sahel/#:~:text=The%20Sahel%20has%20seen%20the,rise%20in%20farmer%2Dherder%20violence.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Middle East Council on Global Affairs. (2024, May 26). Crisis Sahel: Causes and consequences of the conflict - Middle East Council on Global Affairs. https://mecouncil.org/publication/crisis-sahel-causes-and-consequences-of-the-conflict-me-council/
[4] Sahel situation. (n.d.). Global Focus. https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/sahel-situation#:~:text=Political%20instability%2C%20escalating%20conflict%20and,climate%20change%20further%20exacerbated%20displacement.
[5] OECD, & Sahel and West Africa Club. (2020). The changing geography of conflict in North and West Africa. In The Geography of Conflict in North and West Africa (pp. 77–124). OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/862be517-en
[6] 'European Parliamentary Research Service. (2024). Sahelexit: The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS (EPRS_BRI(2024)762295_EN). European Parliament.
[7] Besenyő, J., Issaev, L., Korotayev, A., Korotayev, A., Besenyő, J., & Issaev, L. (2024). Introduction: Terrorism and Political Contention in North Africa and the Sahel Region. In Terrorism and Political Contention. Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53429-4_1.
[8] Ibid. p.154
[9] Ibid. p. 157
[10] Middle East Council on Global Affairs. (2024, May 26). Crisis Sahel: Causes and consequences of the conflict - Middle East Council on Global Affairs. https://mecouncil.org/publication/crisis-sahel-causes-and-consequences-of-the-conflict-me-council/
[11] Sahel crisis explained. unrefugees. (n.d.). https://www.unrefugees.org/news/sahel-crisis-explained/
and Violent extremism in the Sahel | Global Conflict Tracker. (n.d.). Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel
[12] Grégory Chauzal. (2022). Roots of Mali’s conflict: Moving beyond the 2012 crisis. Clingendael Institute. p.8
[13] Sahel 2021: Communal wars, broken ceasefires, and shifting frontlines - mali. ReliefWeb. (2021, June 17). https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/sahel-2021-communal-wars-broken-ceasefires-and-shifting-frontlines
[14] EV, H. (n.d.). Country profile. HSS - Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung e.V. https://westafrica.hss.de/burkina-faso/country-profile/
[15] Issaev, L. M., Korotayev, A. V., & Bobarykina, D. A. (2022). The Global Terrorist Threat in the Sahel and the Origins of Terrorism in Burkina Faso. Vestnik Rossiĭskogo Universiteta Druzhby Narodov. Serii͡a︡ Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheni͡a, 22(2), 411–421. https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2022-22-2-411-421
[16] Fellow, M. D. R. (n.d.). Political Upheaval and Counter-Terrorism in Burkina Faso: Between a rock and a hard place. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT. https://www.icct.nl/publication/political-upheaval-and-counter-terrorism-burkina-faso-between-rock-and-hard-place
[17] Ibid.
[18]Shvili, J. (2021, February 15). Landlocked countries in Africa. WorldAtlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/landlocked-countries-in-africa.html
[19] Niger: Nutrition profile. U.S. Agency for International Development. (n.d.). U.S. Agency For International Development. https://www.usaid.gov/document/niger-nutrition-profile
[20] Ibid.
[21] Besenyő, J., Issaev, L., Korotayev, A., Korotayev, A., Besenyő, J., & Issaev, L. (2024). Introduction: Terrorism and Political Contention in North Africa and the Sahel Region. In Terrorism and Political Contention. Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53429-4_1.
[22] Ibid p. 169-195
[23] Group of five for the Sahel Joint Force. (n.d.). Security Council Report. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-05/group-of-five-for-the-sahel-joint-force-9.php
[24] Treaty | Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). (n.d.). https://old22.ecowas.int/ecowas-law/treaties/#:~:text=The%20Economic%20Community%20of%20West,in%201975%20in%20Lagos%2C%20Nigeria
[25] Klomegah, K. K. (2024, September 17). The Alliance of Sahel States: Implications, challenges and prospects in West Africa. Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/17/the-alliance-of-sahel-states-implications-challenges-and-prospects-in-west-africa/
[26] 'European Parliamentary Research Service. (2024). Sahelexit: The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS (EPRS_BRI(2024)762295_EN). European Parliament. p.1
[28] Afrique Média. (2024, July 6). A historic summit in Niamey: Towards a new currency for the Sahel States Alliance (AES). https://afriquemedia.tv/2024/07/06/a-historic-summit-in-niamey-towards-a-new-currency-for-the-sahel-states-alliance-aes/
[29] X.com. (n.d.). X (Formerly Twitter). https://x.com/MaliMaeci/status/1751898490110714080/photo/1
[31] Ibid.
[32] The Sahel’s intertwined challenges. (2024, September 3). IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/09/the-sahels-intertwined-challenges-yabi
[33] Alliance of Sahel states: Beginner’s guide – Analysis. (2024, July 19). Eurasia Review. https://www.eurasiareview.com/20072024-alliance-of-sahel-states-beginners-guide-analysis/
[34] 'European Parliamentary Research Service. (2024). Sahelexit: The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS (EPRS_BRI(2024)762295_EN). European Parliament. p.1
[35] Ibid. p. 3 & 4
[36] The lifting of sanctions on Mali and Guinea is mentioned in the final communiqué of the 24 February 2024 Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government (points 27, 28, and 29); Burkina Faso is not explicitly mentioned, as it is mainly targeted by individual and political sanctions, which are not lifted.
[37] 'European Parliamentary Research Service. (2024). Sahelexit: The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS (EPRS_BRI(2024)762295_EN). European Parliament. p.1
[38] NALYTICAL NOTE N° 02 | FES PSCC. THE AES COUNTRIES’ EXIT FROM ECOWAS AND THE BUILDING OF REGIONAL SECURITY Dr. Sampala BALIMA April 2024
[39] Alliance of Sahel states: Beginner’s guide – Analysis. (2024, July 19). Eurasia Review. https://www.eurasiareview.com/20072024-alliance-of-sahel-states-beginners-guide-analysis/
[40] X.com. (n.d.). X (Formerly Twitter). https://x.com/MaliMaeci/status/1751898490110714080/photo/1
[41] Explainer - why are Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger quitting West Africa’s regional bloc? Anadolu Ajansı. (n.d.). https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/explainer-why-are-mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-quitting-west-africas-regional-bloc/3123217
[42] Ibid.
[43] Klomegah, K. K. (2024, September 17). The Alliance of Sahel States: Implications, challenges and prospects in West Africa. Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/17/the-alliance-of-sahel-states-implications-challenges-and-prospects-in-west-africa/
[44] 'European Parliamentary Research Service. (2024). Sahelexit: The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS (EPRS_BRI(2024)762295_EN). European Parliament. p.5-6
[45] Klomegah, K. K. (2024, September 17). The Alliance of Sahel States: Implications, challenges and prospects in West Africa. Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/17/the-alliance-of-sahel-states-implications-challenges-and-prospects-in-west-africa/
[46] Ibid. p.7
[47] 'European Parliamentary Research Service. (2024). Sahelexit: The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS (EPRS_BRI(2024)762295_EN). European Parliament. p.6
[48] Ibid. p.7
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